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Abstract 
Increasing tax revenues in low income countries is essential to address future development 
finance requirements. This is particularly important for aid recipients, the focus of this paper. 
Theory shows that although there are many ways in which aid can have indirect effects on tax 
revenue, the direct effects arise because aid and tax are alternative sources of revenue and 
political economy factors influence the choices made by government. Aid may discourage tax 
effort if viewed as a politically less costly source of revenue. Under different conditions, the 
policies and reforms associated with aid may increase revenue, through promoting growth, 
encouraging more efficient tax structures or supporting reforms to tax administration. While 
cross-country evidence reveals no systematic pattern, country studies show that aid can be 
associated with administrative and efficiency reforms to increase tax revenue. The conclusion 
discusses how aid and donors can promote increasing domestic tax revenue. 
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JEL classification: F35, H20, O23 
 Aid and Domestic Resource Mobilization  1 
 
   
 
Aid and Domestic Resource Mobilization with a focus on Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
 
1 Introduction 
As sustainable development targets are set to replace the Millennium Development Goals 
there is widespread recognition that increased financing will be required to meet development 
targets. Traditional sources of development finance, in particular aid, are unlikely to increase 
sufficiently to meet future needs. New sources of finance and leveraging the private sector 
offer promise, but these are uncertain and untested. It is important that developing countries 
increase the amount of their own funds available for development finance, i.e. domestic 
revenue mobilization (DRM), in particular increasing tax revenues (for a given growth rate, 
borrowing is only a temporary solution as future revenue must increase to service and repay 
debt). This is a major challenge for low-income countries (LICs) where revenue/GDP ratios 
have been relatively low for decades and are only increasing gradually. For example, in sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) in 2014 median domestic revenue was 18.5% of GDP, an increase from 
16.6% over 2004-08; this compares to median government expenditure of 28.2% and 21.9% 
respectively. For SSA LICs in 2014 mean domestic revenue was 16% of GDP (13% over 
2004-08) compared to mean government expenditure of 22% and 21% respectively (IMF, 
2015, pp. 82-3). There is wide variation within SSA as resource-rich countries have higher 
revenues (which include resource rents) whereas resource-poor countries that rely almost fully 
on taxes have lower revenues.1 As the majority of major aid recipients (as a share of GDP) and 
LICs are in SSA the paper focusses on SSA evidence although the issues are relevant to 
developing countries, especially LICs. 
 In broad terms there are three ways in which aid may have effects on tax revenue. At 
the most general level, as aid has macroeconomic effects and tax revenues are affected by 
macroeconomic performance, there can be indirect effects of aid on revenue. For example, if 
aid is effective in supporting growth revenue should increase in line with an expanding tax 
                                                          
1 Excluding Nigeria, which tends to have relatively low revenue, six SSA oil exporters had on 
average a revenue/GDP ratio of 35% over 2004-08 whereas the respective mean for middle-
income SSA countries excluding South Africa was 21.7% and for SSA LICs was 13.2% (IMF, 
2015, Table SA10, p. 82) 
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base (although the tax/GDP ratio may not increase).  Second, there may be direct fiscal 
effects: as most aid finances public goods and services it may substitute for efforts to raise tax 
revenue or, for a given level of tax, support a higher level of government spending. Such 
direct effects will be related to the amount of aid relative to the level of taxation. Finally, 
policies and conditions associated with aid (the broader donor-recipient relationship) can 
affect tax revenue. Support for tax administration or policy reform should increase revenue 
but other policy reforms may reduce revenue, at least in the short term (e.g. tariff reductions 
as part of trade reforms). In analyzing the relationship it is difficult to disentangle these 
various potential effects. 
 This paper assesses the literature on the effects of aid on tax revenue to identify lessons 
and implications for using aid to support and promote DRM. Political economy theory 
provides a conceptual framework linking taxation, as one element of policy that can be used to 
favour certain groups or interests, and aid (especially conditionality as this captures differences 
between objectives of donors and governments). This is outlined in Section 2. To focus 
discussion, attention is restricted largely to theoretical and empirical analysis of direct links 
between aid and taxation. Consequently, the large literatures on the macroeconomics of aid 
(such as general equilibrium models incorporating aid and tax), political economy of taxation 
and aid conditionality are only alluded to as conceptual background. The core issue is how aid 
and donors (i.e. conditions and policies associated with aid as distinct from the amount of aid) 
influence decisions on how much tax to raise and how to raise it. This literature identifies 
channels through which aid can affect taxation and factors to allow for in exploring the 
relationship. This literature does not provide the basis of empirical models for direct effects of 
aid on taxation but highlights the importance of political economy considerations affecting 
choices over tax and aid. 
 The theoretical foundations for empirical analysis of direct effects are derived from the 
pioneering study by Heller (1975) proposing fiscal response models (FRMs): in the budget 
determination process governments set targets for expenditure and revenue and utility is 
maximized by achieving the targets (this minimizes the political loss function on which the 
model is based). Aid received by the government is an additional source of revenue that is 
treated either as relaxing the budget constraint or altering the formation of targets (i.e. tax can 
be lower and/or spending can be higher than in the absence of aid). The fundamental issue is 
the fiscal response to aid – how does aid affect tax and spending outcomes (see Section 2.3)? 
The theory does not give a general prediction of the fiscal effects of aid: spending should 
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increase but not necessarily fully by the amount of aid (although it may even increase by more 
than the aid); tax may be reduced, unchanged or even increased.  In the FRM approach the 
fiscal effects of aid vary from country to country, reflecting weights attached to variables in 
the utility function that depend on underlying political and economic factors. 
 Section 3 reviews the empirical literature, distinguishing cross-country panel studies and 
FRM country studies applying time series methods. There is no consensus in the literature 
using cross-country regressions for the effect of aid on tax performance (measured as the 
revenue/GDP ratio): results are not robust to changes in sample or econometric modeling 
choice. Time series studies are informative on specific countries and suggest that tax is not 
responsive to aid, but they are no panacea; a relatively long time series is required and 
estimates are reliant on the quality of the data, which is often limited for LICs.  Although 
there does not appear to be a systematic effect of aid on tax across countries the empirical 
evidence suggests conditions under which aid can support DRM.   
Section 4 concludes by discussing how aid can be used to support reforms promoting 
domestic resource mobilization. The theoretical literature gives some guidance on which 
political and economic characteristics of countries are important for aid influencing tax and 
the empirical literature does show that it is not the simple amount of aid that matters. It can 
be inferred from the literature that the fundamental determinant of whether aid and donors 
can promote DRM is the willingness of the recipient to implement tax reforms. The evidence 
on tax reform is promising: significant reforms to tax structure have been implemented in 
many countries, increasing efficiency (of the tax system and collection) and reducing 
distortions (Keen and Mansour, 2010), in addition to improvements in tax administration 
(Moore, 2014). The policy implications discussed in the final section are the types of 
interventions that can help to improve tax performance and promote DRM. 
 
2 Conceptual Context: Choosing between Tax and Aid  
Aid recipients, especially LICs, face a situation where domestic revenue is too low to meet 
expenditure needs to provide the level of public goods required for growth and development; 
this is one reason why they receive aid and why it is often in the form of grants. The low 
domestic revenue does not imply that tax effort is weak, i.e. that tax/GDP ratios are 
particularly low and/or less than what could reasonably be achieved given the tax base and 
economic structure of such economies. Domestic revenue mobilization may be as high as is 
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feasible (Keen and Simone, 2004) or even desirable, especially as LICs have tended to rely 
relatively heavily on highly distorting taxes on trade. Distortionary taxes are one example of 
the policy distortions analysed in political economy models illustrating that the potential for 
aid to have beneficial effects via taxation depends on the nature of the government and tax 
structure (Section 2.1). An alternative approach, set out in Section 2.2, views governments as 
choosing between aid and tax as alternative sources of revenue with attendant costs and 
benefits. The FRM approach formalises this as budgetary choices (Section 2.3). 
 
2.1 Political Economy Considerations 
Political economy analyses identify institutional failure in LICs arising because governments 
favour specific groups at the expense of the public, and this generates policy distortions (e.g. 
Bates, 1981). The outcome is a politics that is not conducive to growth, particularly 
pronounced in Africa (Azam, 2008; Bates, 2008). This literature is more concerned with 
distributional policies and political considerations influencing the choice between productive 
and non-productive expenditure, where the former refers to provision of public goods and 
services and the latter to transfers to favoured groups, than the choice between aid and tax. It 
is informative regarding how politics leads to policy distortions, corruption and rent-seeking 
that undermines growth, and provides the basic motivation for including political or 
institutional quality variables in cross-country regressions, but is rarely explicit about the 
relationship between aid and taxation.   
 Adam and O’Connell (1999) combine elements of macroeconomic and political 
economy theory to illustrate conditions under which aid may or may not reduce the adverse 
effects of distortionary taxation. Taxes, paid by all households, finance productive spending 
and transfers but are distortionary so higher taxes reduce the quality of investment and thus 
growth (one tax reform implication is to shift to less distortionary taxes). They present a 
model where the government is ‘captured’ by a group representing a proportion of the 
population, so that the government may be acting in the interests of a narrow elite or may 
have a more encompassing politics acting in the interests of the broader private sector as a 
whole. The introduction of aid into this system may shift the political equilibrium.  
 The mechanism in the model (represented by a parameter for the proportion of the 
population in whose interests the government acts) is that transfers paid for by distortionary, 
hence growth-reducing, taxation are consumed exclusively by the elite but the costs are spread 
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across the economy as a whole.  If the elite is small (low proportion of population) the gains 
to the elite from distortionary taxation (the higher consumption by the elite due to the 
transfers) outweigh the costs to them (because the costs of distortionary taxation are shared 
across the whole economy).  The equilibrium is transfers to a narrow elite financed by growth-
reducing taxation. If the ‘elite’ becomes large enough it will be in the elite’s interest to limit 
transfers because the cost to the broad elite of higher taxation outweighs the benefit of 
transfers spread across a large proportion of the population.  This equilibrium developmental 
state with a broad ‘encompassing interest’ eschews transfers in favour of productive spending. 
Introducing unconditional aid may shift the encompassing interest point so that a 
developmental state reverts back to transfers to a narrow elite (Adam and O’Connell, 1999: 
237). 
 There are a number of implications for analysis of the effects of aid on taxation. First, 
effects on the level of tax may not be important: if aid is used to reduce distortionary taxes it is 
likely to be beneficial even if tax/GDP ratios are lower. Thus tax policies promoted by donors 
to reduce distortions, such as reducing tariffs and replacing with VAT or supporting 
administrative reforms, may be more important than effects on the level of tax. Second, to the 
extent that the objective of aid is to support growth the composition of spending, in particular 
the level of productive spending, is as important as the level of tax. This is consistent with the 
fiscal response approach. Third, conditional aid is the mechanism through which donors 
attempt to address institutional failures or distortionary politics, but how this may affect the 
political equilibrium is complex (Adam and O’Connell, 1999: 242-3). In the fiscal context the 
relevant conditions relate to tax and expenditure composition (in the context of budget 
support see Clist et al, 2012), and relevant policy implications include tax structure and 
administrative reforms (discussed in Section 4). 
 
2.2 Political Calculus 
A dimension that has not attracted explicit attention in this literature is that the recipient 
government may perceive political costs and benefits of aid and taxation as alternative sources 
of revenue so there is a trade-off – a political calculus between aid and tax where each is 
evaluated according to autonomy and accountability and bureaucratic costs (Morrissey and 
Torrance, 2015). A government that values autonomy and wants to be less aid dependent will 
choose more tax effort. As donor agencies have to account for their aid spending, donors 
place increasing emphasis on measures to monitor the use of aid, minimise fungible use and 
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tackle corruption. The policy reform conditions and technical assistance associated with aid 
increase the political costs of aid as some control and influence is ceded to donors. More 
effort has to be made to account to donors for how aid is used than to account to taxpayers 
for how taxes are raised or spent. The latter will depend on the nature of the democracy, 
which is typically weak in LICs, at least for accountability to taxpayers.  
 The requirements of accounting to donors and negotiating on conditionality reduce the 
autonomy of aid recipients by limiting their policy discretion; even limited conditionality is a 
constraint on policy action (if only because effort has to be expended to avoid or circumvent 
the conditions). Governments can be expected to prefer greater autonomy (being seen as 
subject to foreign influences can undermine domestic popularity so aid dependence is a 
political cost). Increasing taxes may impose a cost of being more accountable to domestic 
constituencies but this is unlikely to offset the benefits of autonomy; indeed, DRM with 
accountability can play an important role in supporting State building and legitimacy (Moore, 
2008; 2014). Countries with access to resource rents may have less incentive to increase taxes: 
Altincekic and Bearce (2014) argue that because aid is subject to conditionality and less 
fungible than resource (oil) revenues governments are more likely to raise domestic resource 
revenues than aid if they want control over how revenues are used. The accountability costs of 
aid, given donor monitoring and perception of external influence on policy, are likely to be 
higher than for taxation so it should not be assumed that governments always prefer aid to 
tax, or indeed that they would substitute aid for tax (as noted above, it is beneficial to 
substitute aid for distortionary taxes). The political calculus may favour taxation to support 
autonomy. 
 The administrative costs of tax should be offset against bureaucratic costs of aid, such 
as the costs of numerous officials meeting with and reporting to donors. As recipients face 
many donors with more and changing requirements on monitoring aid delivered in different 
ways for multiple purposes, aid costs remain high. The trend in bureaucratic costs is likely to 
favour taxes over aid, given emphasis on improving public finance management (PFM) and 
encouraging anti-corruption measures. Even if PFM and tax administration reforms are 
difficult to implement effectively to achieve sustained improvements (Andrews, 2013) there 
have been significant achievements in tax administration and fiscal reforms (Moore, 2014) that 
reduce the bureaucratic costs of taxation. Ahlerup et al (2015) provide evidence that semi-
autonomous revenue authorities in SSA have been associated with increased tax collection for 
given tax rates, at least in the short term (the effect tends to plateau after about five years). 
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The merit of such revenue authorities, now in place in some 15 SSA countries (mostly Eastern 
and Southern Africa), is that collecting taxes is sub-contracted to the independent agency 
(which receives performance incentives). The weakness is that government (politicians) retain 
control over tax policy, especially granting exemptions (so they can still favour selected 
groups, although in a less distortionary manner than in standard political economy models).  
 Governments may be most amenable to aid when they view it as a resource to which 
they have (personal) access; arguments such as this lie at the root of theoretical papers on aid 
conditionality failure (e.g. Svensson, 2003). Thus, when aid is given to corrupt autocratic 
regimes one would not be surprised if tax collection was relatively low. This is a problem of 
the particular donor-recipient relationship rather than the effect of an amount of aid on tax 
effort (in another country the same amount of aid could be used effectively). Weak 
governance, rent seeking and corruption are all typical features of LICs that help to explain 
their poor economic performance, hence they receive aid. Corruption and rent seeking can 
also help explain relatively low tax collection, as exemptions are pervasive and evasion is 
undetected or not punished. Whether aid affects corruption is a separate question that is not 
easy to address. It is reasonable to posit that corrupt individuals are most concerned with easy 
money, i.e. less transparent transactions are more attractive because the corrupt wish to 
minimise the possibility of being observed. On this basis aid is least attractive because it is 
subject to greater monitoring by donors; corruption involving donor funds is more likely to be 
observed and investigated (the only claim is less, not no, corruption). Donor technical support 
and institutional interventions for monitoring tax and public expenditure are intended to 
reduce corruption in public finance, but may be most effective for aid funds. Thus there are 
circumstances under which the political calculus could favour taxation over aid, at least at the 
margin, and these are more likely to apply under better governance and fiscal institutions. 
 
2.3 Fiscal Response 
Heller (1975) introduced fiscal response models (FRMs) where utility for the ‘public decision 
makers’ is represented by: 
 U = F [Ig, T, GC, GS, B] (1) 
Public sector policymakers are assumed to act in a rational, utility-maximizing manner where 
(1) is represented as a loss function such that utility is reduced to the extent that the targets 
(determined in the budgetary process) are not achieved for, respectively, public investment, 
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tax revenue, civil consumption spending, socioeconomic government spending and 
borrowing. Governments maximize their utility by attaining their revenue and expenditure 
targets.  Heller (1975, p. 430) recognized that aid affects the decisions although it was not 
included in the utility function for (1) but instead entered as an inflow that relaxed the budget 
constraint. Franco-Rodriquez et al (1998) incorporated aid directly into the utility function so 
that targets for aid were included along with other fiscal targets. Specific predictions for the 
effect of aid could be made if explicit weights were attached to the variables in the utility 
function (corresponding to an assessment of the costs and benefits of variables as discussed in 
Section 2.2) but the literature treats these as parameters to be estimated. 
 Although assuming that donors intend that aid is allocated to investment spending, 
Heller (1975, p. 433) acknowledged that fungible aid would be apportioned between 
government investment (Ig) and consumption (GC, GS) spending. The model was estimated for 
11 African countries using annual data for the 1960s, and suggested that aid supports 
increased investment spending and, although there appeared to be some reduction in taxes, 
‘the reduction in public fiscal effort is primarily focussed on reduced borrowing than reduced 
taxation’ (Heller, 1975, p. 442). McGillivray and Morrissey (2004) review the FRM literature 
and note that results for tax effects vary, as may be expected. Section 3.2 reviews recent FRM 
country studies applying time series methods.  
 
3 Aid and Revenue: Empirical Evidence 
The empirical literature addressing specifically the effect of aid on tax revenue is not extensive 
and falls into one of two types, cross-country regressions including aid among the determinants 
of the revenue/GDP ratio (most studies use the total, i.e. tax and non-tax revenue) and studies 
estimating FRMs (mostly for individual countries). Both derive the theoretical motivation from 
Heller (1975), albeit loosely in the former (the specification is a standard tax performance 
equation augmented with aid), as providing the framework in which aid received by the 
government can alter choices on other fiscal variables, specifically revenue in the former (most 
FRM studies focus more on effects on spending). Political economy factors are not explicitly 
included, except insofar as some cross-country studies control for institutional quality and 
country studies refer to the political economy context as part of the narrative (but do not include 
institutional variables in the analysis). These literatures are discussed in turn. 
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3.1 Cross-Country Panel Evidence 
Although motivated by the underlying budget identity (Gupta et al, 2004, pp. 388-9), the 
specification employed in cross-country regressions is a representation of the contemporaneous 
tax performance relationship. In principle, if one had detailed information on the composition of 
each tax base, such as incomes and consumption spending, tax revenue can be calculated as the 
sum of the tax rates applied to respective tax bases. In practice such detail is not available so 
proxy variables are used to capture the base. Typically shares of agriculture, industry and trade in 
GDP are employed. The agriculture share is intended to capture the tendency for the large 
agriculture sector in LICs to be primarily subsistence, hence generating low revenue because 
subsistence farmers (and the informal sector more generally) have low incomes that are difficult 
to tax directly (the expected coefficient is negative). Commercial agriculture is captured through 
agri-business (in industry) or exports (in trade). The coefficient on industry is expected to be 
positive as this variable captures the level of production activity that is more likely to be taxed 
(through incomes, profits or consumption spending). Trade is expected to be particularly 
important given the historic reliance on tariffs and export taxes. It also relates to political 
economy factors both because these were often the most distortionary taxes and have been 
significantly reduced over time.  
The recent cross-country literature on the effect of aid on tax performance is based on 
estimating a model following Gupta et al (2004, p. 391), for country i in period t: 
 lnRit = 0 + 1AGRit + 2INDit + 3TVit + 4Yit + 5Fit + 6Lit + it (2) 
 
 The dependent variable, R, is the ratio of domestic revenue to GDP; the log 
transformation is used because this non-negative variable is positively skewed. Tax revenue 
alone is rarely used; instead total revenue comprises taxes plus non-tax revenue (NTR, 
primarily revenues from resource extraction, often termed resource rents). Aid is 
disaggregated into grants (F) and net loans (L), net aid in total is also used (all as ratios of 
GDP) and sometimes aid-squared terms are included.  The share of agriculture (AGR), 
industry (IND) and trade (TV), the trade volume measure of imports (M) plus exports (X),2 in 
GDP are proxy measures of the tax base; revenue is expected to be decreasing in AGR and 
                                                          
2 Clist and Morrissey (2011) include X and M separately in place of TV on the basis that tariffs 
and export taxes have been reduced at different times and degrees whilst exports may capture 
the revenue impact of increased activity in cash crop and resource sectors.  
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increasing in IND and trade. GDP per capita (Y) captures the level of development (ceteris 
paribus associated with greater tax collection efficiency so higher revenues).  
 The analyst faces three challenges in estimating (2): measuring revenue; dealing with 
endogeneity; and accounting for heterogeneity. Regarding the first, Gupta et al (2004), Clist 
and Morrissey (2011), Benedek et al (2012) and Carter (2013) uses IMF data on total revenue 
(but the samples are not identical). Morrissey and Torrance (2015) use tax revenue (that 
excludes resource revenues placed in the NTR category) from the Government Revenue 
Dataset (GRD) compiled by the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). The 
GRD provides data on total government revenue, breaks this down by tax headings insofar as 
possible, and distinguishes total tax revenue and NTR for the period 1970-2010 (Prichard et al, 
2014). As the IMF and GRD sources yield different samples and no study has compared both 
for identical samples it is difficult to know how much of the variation in results is due to 
measurement differences (but neither source gives robust results). 
 There is simultaneity between aid and tax: poor countries that receive more aid (and for 
whom it is more likely to be in the form of grants) are also likely to have low tax ratios. While 
controls capture this to some extent, there may be within variation (differences in countries 
over time) related to these characteristics. For example, to the extent that aid increases in 
response to negative shocks (Lensink and Morrissey, 2001) that may also reduce tax revenue, 
the negative correlation can be observed within for some countries (those most vulnerable to 
shocks). Studies of aid and tax employ internal instruments to address endogeneity and results 
are sensitive to the approach taken. In principle, aid could be instrumented adopting 
approaches used in aid-growth studies but such instruments are usually weak (see discussion in 
Dreher and Lohmann, 2015) and have not been employed in this literature. 
 Gupta et al (2004) lag aid one period (i.e. one year) and report a negative effect of grants 
and positive effect of loans on tax. Clist and Morrissey (2011) adopt longer lags for aid on the 
basis that, following FRMs, tax effort (target revenue) is an outcome of the budget process 
hence influenced by expectations of aid (for which historic aid is a proxy); changes in aid 
would take time to alter expectations and hence to affect tax effort. While the use of lags alone 
does not identify the effect of aid the significance of the aid coefficient disappears with longer 
lags (the country time series studies cited below find no evidence that tax responds to aid). 
Morrissey and Torrance (2015) use GRD and tax revenue; although they can replicate the 
results of Gupta et al (2004) for pooled OLS, results are not robust for other estimators or 
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including alternative control variables; generally the coefficients on aid variables become 
insignificant (and when significant are more often positive).  
 Benedek et al (2012) employ a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator and 
claim that the negative effect of grants on tax effort is a robust result. While GMM estimators 
can address endogeneity under certain conditions, Carter (2013) argues that the required 
conditions are unlikely to be met in the current context and shows using more flexible 
econometric techniques (panel time series and group fixed effects estimators) that the 
previous result are not robust. Clist (2014) observes that the problem of artificial changes in 
revenue (due solely to changing the data source) from combining data from different sources 
are built in to the internal instruments used in GMM so the results in Benedek et al (2012) may 
not be as reliable as claimed. A comparison of results from the studies covered here show that 
findings of a negative or positive effect of aid on revenue are not robust. One is likely to 
observe a negative association between aid, especially grants, and revenue, especially for the 
1970s and 1980s, but there is no solid basis to infer causality. The negative association is less 
likely to be observed after the 1980s or for countries with relatively better institutional quality. 
 Heterogeneity is a plausible reason for the absence of robust results as very different types 
of countries are included, such as LICs, transition economies and upper middle income 
countries with negligible aid receipts. Cross-country aid-growth regressions face the same 
challenge: as each recipient has distinct characteristics and different factors that interact to 
affect growth performance the dynamic relationship between aid and growth is specific to 
each country (Herzer and Morrissey, 2013). Similarly, the determinants of tax revenues and 
how they are affected by aid vary across and within countries, and of course the central 
determinant of this is how political economy factors play out in each country.  
  An inherent limitation of cross-country tax ratio regressions is that the important 
country-level determinants of revenue are not adequately captured by available data. The 
results are indicative on how tax ratios vary broadly according to changes in economic 
structure and income levels. The results are less informative on the effects of aid on tax as the 
approach does not identify the ways in which aid affects tax. The effect of aid on taxation 
depends more on technical assistance and policy reforms associated with aid than on the 
amount of aid. Such policies or conditionality can affect the tax base or rates or overall 
collection efficiency through tax administration reforms, but studies do not capture any 
relationship between aid and tax policy reforms. Some reforms associated with aid 
conditionality may reduce tax revenue in the short term yet promote increased revenues in the 
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longer term. The immediate effect of trade liberalisation is a reduction in tariffs so, for given 
import levels, revenues fall initially (Aizenman and Jinjarak, 2009). However, tariffs are 
distortionary so fewer and lower tariffs discourage avoidance and evasion and the reduced 
price distortions and economic efficiency encouraged by liberalisation may increase the level 
of imports so tariff revenues can increase. The principal limitation of cross-country studies is 
the failure to incorporate differences in reform efforts at the country level. 
  
3.2 Aid and Tax from a country perspective 
Countries have implemented tax and related reforms in different ways, at varying speeds and 
intensities, and with different degrees of support from donors or influence of aid 
conditionality. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect effects on tax revenues will vary across 
countries; it is very unlikely that any relationship between aid and revenue would be similar 
across the variety of LICs. Although the amount of aid allocated specifically to support tax 
and fiscal reforms is quite small, donors and technical support have influenced the pattern of 
reform (for the case of tariff reforms see Jones et al, 2011). The potential effects of the 
amount of aid on tax effort have been addressed in FRM studies of the fiscal effects of aid 
which examine the relationships between domestic revenue, government spending and aid as a 
fiscal system (Section 2.3 above). 
 There are relatively few country studies using time series methods, and few explicitly 
focus on the effect on taxation. In the first study of this type, Osei et al (2005) for Ghana over 
1966-1998 found that aid was associated with increased tax revenue. This was not an effect of 
the amount of aid on tax effort but because of successful reforms in the 1980s associated with 
aid conditionality, especially in the cocoa sector, that increased economic activity and 
therefore supported a rise in tax revenue. They also found that the increase in aid was used to 
reduce domestic borrowing, again because of conditionality. In this case it was policy 
conditions not the amount of aid that affected tax revenue. Morrissey et al (2007), using data 
for Kenya over 1964-2002, found no evidence that aid grants adjusted to or influenced tax 
revenue, or even that tax was an adjusting variable (tax did not appear to adjust to fiscal 
disequilibria); aid loans responded to budget deficits so although they did not influence tax 
revenue they may have adjusted to revenue shortfalls. In the Kenyan case also the amount of 
aid did not affect tax revenue. 
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 More recent studies of the fiscal effects of aid adopt cointegrated vector autoregressive 
(CVAR) time series methods that allow estimates of which variables drive the system and how 
the variables respond to each other following the methodology of Juselius (2006). This 
method is quite useful as one can in principle distinguish whether or not tax adjusts to aid 
(this would be required to demonstrate that aid influences tax effort), as the testing 
methodology allows one to distinguish the cointegration relations (pulling forces) from the 
stochastic trends (pushing forces) and to test for purely adjusting variables (completely 
endogenous in the system), the shocks to which have only transitory effects. Bwire et al (2015) 
analyse the relationship between foreign aid and domestic fiscal variables in Uganda over the 
period 1972-2008 using this CVAR method. The results show that aid is a pushing force in the 
system associated with increased tax revenue and public spending. Tax revenue is not an 
adjusting variable although it does respond (positively) to aid, and shocks to tax have only 
transitory effects. 
 Mascagni and Timmis (2014), using CVAR with government data for Ethiopia over 
1960-2009, find that aid (grants and loans) is positively related to tax revenue. There is no 
evidence that tax adjusts to aid (i.e. aid is not driving tax); rather, as aid is an adjusting variable 
in the fiscal system the finding suggests that donors rewarded Ethiopia when it increased 
domestic revenue (they also seemed to reward development spending). As above, it is the 
relationship with donors rather than the amount of aid that mattered. ‘This relation may be 
explained by a beneficial effect of aid in improving tax policies and strengthening the tax 
administration. Indeed, throughout the whole period the government of Ethiopia has received 
foreign advice on tax matters, and this remains one of the policy areas of highest agreement 
between the government and donors today’ (Mascagni and Timmis, 2014, p35). Martins 
(2010), using CVAR for quarterly data for Ethiopia over 1993-2008, also finds that aid 
responds to development spending, but finds no evidence that aid affects tax revenue 
(perhaps because quarterly data is not appropriate to capture tax policy responses). Although 
relevant studies only cover Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda, there is no evidence that aid 
reduces tax revenue, in some cases it supports increases in tax revenue and the conditions or 
policies associated with aid appear more important for tax than the amount of aid. 
  
4  Conclusion: Aid Support for Domestic Revenue  
The empirical evidence may appear to show that grants reduce tax effort but this could be 
simple correlation: LICs have a low tax base and relatively low revenue but receive aid (grants) 
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because they are poor, hence the observed correlation between high aid and low tax. Results 
are sensitive to specification, estimation method, data and sample. Theoretical considerations 
show that any effect of aid on tax reflects a revenue choice that will vary across countries 
depending on political economy factors; ultimately it is a political choice, which donors may 
influence through support and conditionality, over which source of revenue best meets 
government objectives (and in practice they may be making choices for changes at the 
margin). Econometric specifications in aid-taxation studies have not adequately accounted for 
policy changes, whether in tax rates or administration (that may be influenced by donors), but 
may capture indirect effects of aid, such as through growth in a tax base. Donor-supported 
policy reforms and technical assistance, such as in tax administration and public finance 
management, may have a greater effect on tax performance than the actual amount of aid.3 
The policy reforms and leverage associated with aid have had effects on improving PFM and 
tax administration, shifting the political calculus away from relying on aid towards taxation. 
 Donors can use aid to leverage DRM by providing technical assistance and policy 
support for reforms that reduce the costs of taxation and encourage recipients to view 
effective DRM as promoting fiscal autonomy; where recipients are receptive, donors could 
also note that DRM supports accountability and State building. Encouraging the establishment 
of semi-autonomous revenue authorities is one innovation that has been found to increase tax 
revenue. An especially promising initiative is the Tax Administration Diagnostic Analysis Tool 
(TADAT) being developed by the IMF in collaboration with a variety of partners (see 
TADAT under www.imf.org) as this allows institutional reforms to be tailored to the 
characteristics and administrative needs of individual countries. This approach can identify the 
weaknesses in the system and prioritise the order in which issues need to be addressed to 
improve tax administration and promote DRM. 
 The TADAT approach identifies nine performance outcome areas (with dimensions 
and indicators for detailed analysis within each). The basic area is integrity of the tax base: do 
the authorities know who should pay tax, is the register up to date and are there mechanisms 
to ensure those who should register do so. Risk management relates to identifying and 
monitoring compliance; there are also areas on voluntary compliance (provision of clear 
information and perceptions of taxpayers), filing tax returns (monitoring that those liable for 
tax file on time), payment obligations (monitoring that the correct tax liability is paid on time) 
                                                          
3 Many tax performance studies include tax policy reforms (e.g. Ahlerup et al, 2015) but do not 
include aid.  
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and ensuring accuracy of reporting (including auditing of returns). The other areas relate to 
administration: dispute resolution (fair and timely), operational efficiency (taxes are collected 
effectively and on time) and accountability (internal and external controls to ensure integrity of 
collection is perceived by taxpayers). 
 The merit of TADAT is the forensic approach to addressing performance of the entire 
system, from the register of taxpayers to compliance, auditing, dispute settlement and overall 
transparency. This can be useful in identifying where the problems lie. For example, if revenue 
is below expectations is it because some taxpayers avoid registering (revealed by the integrity 
of the tax base) or those who are registered are not paying in full (identified through risk 
management and payment obligations); in practice it may be a combination of both but the 
diagnostic analysis allows authorities to assess which areas should be given priority. The 
answer to such a question informs the appropriate response. For example, if the main shortfall 
is due to compliance it could be because taxpayers are not well informed about what they 
should pay (addressed through improving mechanisms for voluntary compliance), because 
monitoring of accuracy of reporting is weak (can be addressed within the authority) or because 
there are avoidance opportunities (which may need to be addressed through legislation, such 
as eliminating loopholes or exemptions). 
 Specific reforms or initiatives, such as adopting new technology to improve operational 
efficiency, can be assessed within this broad framework. To increase VAT collection rates, the 
Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA) phased in the use of electronic sales 
register machines over 2008-2013 to register transactions by businesses for VAT. In principle 
this allows the ERCA to receive data on reported revenues and VAT liabilities on a daily basis 
and to monitor reporting patterns; ‘unusual activity’ such as fewer transactions than would be 
expected for the business can be identified and visits by officials can be targeted. This 
improvement in risk management and monitoring payment obligations is estimated to have 
increased VAT revenue by up to 20 per cent (Ali et al, 2015). However, as only registered 
businesses are required to use the machines, sustained effectiveness relies on the integrity of 
the register and businesses could evade by closing down and re-emerging in the informal 
sector. Ethiopia has a competent, semi-autonomous, ERCA and maintains an industrial 
census so the register is accurate by SSA standards, and tax collection is relatively good. The 
technology may not be as effective in other LICs with weaker capacity, but TADAT provides 
a method to assess the needs and weakness of any country and identify where aid-financed 
technical support should be targeted. 
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 Aid amounts are likely to influence fiscal behaviour, including taxation, insofar as the aid 
is revenue to the government and therefore included in budgeting decisions, but any such 
effects can vary from country to country. Fiscal responses to aid are likely to vary according to 
the importance of aid in the budget and the government’s preferences and fiscal space over 
spending and other sources of revenue (tax, non-tax and borrowing). Country studies of the 
fiscal effects of aid suggest they tend to be positive; although there is a negative association 
between aid and tax across countries, improvements in technical support and tax policy advice 
from donors promote sustainable increases in tax revenue when they can work with 
government. 
 Policies associated with aid are likely to be more important than the amount of aid for 
promoting domestic revenue mobilization, and in particular increases in tax revenue. 
Countries that show willingness to increase tax effort, where aid is associated with or has 
rewarded increasing tax revenue, are the most amenable to continued donor leverage, but 
donors can influence reform in other countries. Aid can play a number of roles, such as 
supporting costs of reform (e.g. compensating for temporary losses of revenue when taxes are 
reformed, such as reducing tariffs); financing technical assistance to implement reforms (such 
as in tax administration); and supporting donor-recipient dialogue to promote administrative 
and institutional reforms. Institutional reforms are difficult to implement and sustain because 
they are deep, in the sense that they impinge on the behaviour (and incentives) for politicians 
and officials. Donors can be most effective by altering preferences, demonstrating the benefits 
to government autonomy associated with reducing reliance on aid relative to taxes and 
showing that increasing tax revenues mobilizes domestic resources in addition to encouraging 
accountability that can underpin building State legitimacy. This will be most difficult where the 
incentive to increase taxes is least, such as where the political economy constellation is 
unfavourable or governments have access to significant resource rents; it will be most 
effective where donors deploy aid to support government initiatives in tax administration and 
collection reform. 
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